The coordination problems are also evident in the DCAs. Differences in the institutional characteristics of the CAD partly reflect distributional problems. Governments are concerned about asymmetric gains, that is, the possibility that their partners will earn more than themselves. Footnote 47 In addition, negotiators know that disclosing a preference for certain design features may encourage others to increase their requirements accordingly. Given these incentives, governments believe that their interlocutors may not be fully transparent about their contractual preferences. This uncertainty, in turn, increases the risk of negotiations failing. Given its broad flexibility as a framework agreement, the DCA raises doubts in particular as to the scope, accuracy and degree of dependence on implementation agreements. THE DCAs are a new form of defence cooperation. In essence, these agreements provide a long-term institutional framework for routine bilateral defence relations, including coordination of defence policy, joint military exercises, working groups and committees, exchanges of training and education, defence research and development, and public procurement. DCAs reserve as a framework the specific modalities for the implementation of protocols and rules of application. This flexibility means that DCAs can both improve traditional defence capabilities and address non-traditional threats such as terrorism, human trafficking, piracy and cybersecurity. It is important that DCAs do not contain reciprocal obligations of defence or non-aggression.
They`re not alliances. And unlike the forms of defence cooperation that dominated high-power politics during the Cold War, they are generally very symmetrical and commit each other to adopting a common set of directives. The growing importance of CAD is reflected in the controversy they sometimes generate. In 1998, the Slovenian Prime Minister faced impeachment proceedings with Israel for a DCA. Footnote 2 An agreement between Belarus and Iran in 2007 provoked public condemnation from the United States and the European Union. Footnote 3 A 1996 DCA between Greece and Armenia led a Turkish government spokesman to accuse Greece of “threatening peace and stability in the region” and of trying to “surround Turkey”. Footnote 4 And a 1995 agreement between Australia and Indonesia proved so controversial that it was not denounced until four years later. Footnote 5 Scholars have long argued that states use defence links to signal affinity with certain employees. Footnote 66 A Brazilian military analyst, who explained the DCA with the United States in 2010, argued that “Brazil is strategically oriented with the United States, as European nations have done with NATO,” while Defense Secretary Robert Gates called the agreement “a formal recognition of the many security interests and values we share.” Footnote 67 In their most ambitious efforts at harmonization, efforts are intertwined with emerging communities. Footnote 68 When the Canadian government signed a DCA with Chile in 2012, it reaffirmed its commitment to “working with like-minded nations to promote peace and security throughout America.” Footnote 69 In 2012, a Philippine senator argued that a DCA with Australia – which complements the DIAC with South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore and Indonesia – would have a pan-Asian “safety screen.” Footnote 70 And Minister Ash Carter`s farewell memo describes the above-mentioned security network as “open to all those who are trying to preserve and strengthen the rules and standards that have strengthened regional stability over the past seven decades.” Footnote 71 Full consideration of these possibilities requires special attention to research design.